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ELIMINATING THE INTENT REQUIREMENT IN
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CASES: PENNSYLVANIA
STATE POLICE V. SUDERS
INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,' the United States
Supreme Court recognized for the first time that employers may be
held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 for
constructive discharge.' The Court also held that constructive
discharge may be considered a tangible employment action,4 and, in
certain circumstances, an employer may raise an affirmative
defense against a claim of constructive discharge.' In so doing, the
Court resolved a split among circuit courts as to whether construc-
tive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action.' Although
Suders offered much-needed clarity on the issue of constructive
discharge,7 the Court did not expressly address the issue of whether
1. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. Id. § 2000e-2.
3. Employees are constructively discharged when they are not actually or formally
terminated by their employers but are forced to quit because of intolerable working
conditions. See, e.g., Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998).
4. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); accord Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808
(1998); see also CHARLES V. DALE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL LAw 6 (2004) (noting that tangible employment action "refers to
any job detriment or benefit that results in significant change in employment status").
5. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 140-41.
6. See id. at 139-40.
7. One question left unanswered after Suders is what exactly constitutes an "official act"
by an employer. See id. at 148. The Court did give some guidance, see infra note 55, but the
scope of actions that may constitute an "official act" is not entirely clear.
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a former employee alleging constructive discharge must prove that
the employer acted intentionally.'
Part I of this Note examines the facts behind Suders and outlines
the Court's holdings. Part II postulates that, although the Court did
not expressly address whether an employee claiming constructive
discharge must prove that the employer acted with intent, the
Court's ruling in Suders may have implicitly eliminated such a
requirement. Part III examines the potential impact of Suders and
suggests that, together with the Court's other holdings in the
case-in particular its definition of constructive discharge and the
damages it made available in constructive discharge cases-
eliminating the intent requirement may create an incentive for
some employees who are subjected to harassment at work to resign
and seek recourse through the courts. Finally, this Note concludes
that, to the degree that Suders creates such an incentive for
employees to quit without first proceeding through the proper
complaint channels, Suders does not advance specific purposes of
Title VII.
I. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS
A Factual Background
Nancy Drew Suders began working for the Pennsylvania State
Police (PSP) in March 1998 as a police communications operator.9
According to Suders, she was subjected to offensive sexual com-
ments and gestures during most of her tenure at the PSP.' ° Suders
claimed that the inappropriate conduct came primarily from three
male supervisors." Specifically, Suders claimed that the station
commander brought "'up [the subject ofi people having sex with
8. Although the Court did not expressly address this issue in Suders, it was discussed
in oral arguments before the Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-7, 41-42, Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03-95), available at http-//www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument transcripts/03-95.pdf.
9. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 436 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police
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animals,'" 2 talked about oral sex with another male supervisor in
Suders's presence, and commented to Suders about his wife's
breasts."l Suders also alleged that another male supervisor made
obscene gestures, apparently imitating a television wrestling move,
"as many as five to ten times per night throughout her five-month
tenure." 4 Suders claimed that on one occasion she told the supervi-
sor that she thought his conduct was inappropriate, and he
responded by jumping onto a chair and repeating the move.'"
According to Suders, a third male supervisor "verbally harassed her
day after day"'" by calling her a liar and telling her that "the village
idiot could do her job.""
In June 1998, after one of her male supervisors accused her of
taking a missing file home with her, Suders contacted the PSP's
Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (EEO Officer).'" Suders told
the EEO Officer that "she might need some help" but did not provide
further details. 9 The EEO Officer gave her phone number to Suders
but never followed up on the conversation."
According to Suders, the harassment "continued unabated" until
it "reached a breaking point" in August 1998.21 Suders contacted the
EEO Officer again and stated that she was being harassed and that
she was afraid.22 Suders claimed that the EEO Officer was "insensi-
tive and unhelpful" and that the EEO Officer told Suders to file a
formal complaint, but did not tell her how to obtain a complaint
form.'
12. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the district court opinion).
13. Id. at 437. Suders also claimed that the station commander made disparaging
comments about her age. Id. at 436.
14. Id. at 437.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Suders also alleged that this male supervisor
indicated that 'she would be the last political appointee who had a job ... at the substation."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




22. Id. According to the EEO Officer, Suders stated that she was being discriminated
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Two days after her conversation with the EEO Officer, Suders
resigned from her position at the PSP.2 4 Suders's resignation was
prompted by allegations that she stole PSP property." Suders had
been required to take a computer skills test several times during her
tenure at the PSP.26 Her supervisors told her that she had failed
each time." When Suders discovered her test papers in a set of
drawers in the women's locker room, she concluded that her
supervisors had lied to her and had never actually forwarded her
exams to the appropriate department for grading, so she took the
tests.28 When Suders later attempted to return the tests to the
drawers, her supervisors confronted her.29 Suders was handcuffed
and interrogated." Feeling "'abused, threatened and held against
her will,'" she tendered her resignation."'
B. The Lower Courts
Suders filed suit against the PSP in federal district court under
Title VII, alleging that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment and that she was constructively discharged. 2 The
district court found that Suders had presented sufficient evidence
to establish an actionable hostile work environment claim;33 the
district court also found, however, that the PSP could not be held
vicariously liable under the affirmative defense articulated by the
24. Id. at 438-39.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 439.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. When her supervisors realized that the tests were missing, they dusted the
drawers with a theft-detection powder that turns hands blue when touched. When the
supervisors saw that Suders's hands were blue, they confronted her. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting the district court opinion). Suders tried to tender her resignation at least
twice before she was ultimately allowed to leave. Id.
32. Id. at 435, 439. In addition to the Title VII claims, Suders also alleged that she had
been discriminated against because of her age and political affiliation and brought claims
against the PSP under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963
(1991). Suders, 325 F.3d at 439. Suders also named her three male supervisors and the EEO
Officer as individual defendants. Id. This Note, however, only addresses Suders's claims under
Title VII against the PSP.
33. See Suders, 325 F.3d at 440.
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United States Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.34 As a result, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the PSP.s5 The district
court did not address Suders's constructive discharge claim.36
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded the case.37 The court's decision was based on its
conclusions that constructive discharge constituted a tangible
employment action and that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense was unavailable to employers in constructive discharge
actions.3"
C. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari39 "to resolve the disagree-
ment among the Circuits on the question [ofi whether a constructive
discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a
tangible employment action and, therefore, precludes assertion of
the affirmative defense articulated in Ellerth and Faragher."4 ° In an
opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court ruled for the first
34. Id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). The affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and Faragher
is known as the "EllerthIFaragher affirmative defense." For more detail about the defense
and its elements, see infra Part I.C.1; see also 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 5:2, 5:5-9, 5:16-38 (2005) (discussing employer
liability for sexual harassment after Ellerth and Faragher and how federal courts are applying
the defense); Dianne Avery, Overview of the Law of Sexual Harassment and Related Claims,
in LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 1, 13-22 (Matthew B. Schiff & Linda C. Kramer
eds., 2d ed. 1999) (discussing employer liability for sexual harassment after Ellerth and
Faragher).
35. Suders, 325 F.3d at 440 (discussing the district court opinion). The district court held
that, under the Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense, the PSP could not be held vicariously
liable for the conduct of Suders's three supervisors or for the conduct of its EEO Officer
because Suders "'unreasonably failed to avail herself of the [PSP's] internal procedures for
reporting any harassment." Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 463.
38. Id. at 462. The EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense is only available to employers
in instances in which no tangible employment action has been taken. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
765; accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also infra Part II.C.2.
39. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
40. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004).
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time that constructive discharge is actionable under Title VII.4 The
Court held that constructive discharge could be, but was not always,
a tangible employment action and that the Ellerth /Faragher
affirmative defense was available to employers in certain construc-
tive discharge cases.42 As a result, the Court vacated the Third
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case.4
1. Building on Precedent: Ellerth and Faragher
The Court's opinion in Suders was built on its holdings in
Ellerth and Faragher. In both Ellerth and Faragher," the Court
"delineate [d] two categories of hostile work environment claims: (1)
harassment that 'culminates in a tangible employment action,' for
which employers are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes
place in the absence of a tangible employment action, to which
employers may assert an affirmative defense."45 The Ellerth Court
reasoned that, in making tangible employment decisions, a supervi-
sor uses her authority "to make economic decisions affecting other
employees under ... her control."46 In such instances, the supervisor
acts as the employer's agent and, therefore, the employer is liable
for the supervisor's conduct.4 v On the other hand, in situations in
which the hostile work environment does not involve a tangible
employment action, it is possible that the supervisor does not
use her status to perpetrate the harassing conduct; instead, the
41. Id. at 132, 142-43. Lower courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), however, have long recognized constructive discharge under Title VII. See id. at 142-
43. Although Suders was the first decision in which the Supreme Court recognized
constructive discharge as a cause of action under Title VII, the Court previously held, in Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984), that constructive discharge was actionable in the
labor law context.
42. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140-41.
43. Id. at 141.
44. The Court decided the two cases on the same day. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998).
45. Suders, 542 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted). "For sexual harassment to be actionable,
it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
47. See id. at 763.
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supervisor's acts may be similar to those of a coworker." In those
situations, the Court reasoned that the supervisor may not always
act as the employer's agent and, therefore, the employer should not
be held strictly liable for the supervisor's conduct and may raise an
affirmative defense to liability.49 To assert the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense, an employer must prove: "(a) that [it] exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreason-
ably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise." °
In making this distinction in liability, the Court focused on the
premise that "Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharrasment policies and effective grievance mechanisms" and
that "Congress's intention [was] to promote conciliation rather than
litigation in the Title VII context."5' The Court also considered the
EEOC's policy of encouraging employers to develop employee
complaint programs.5 2 "To the extent limiting employer liability
could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it
becomes severe or pervasive, it would ... serve Title VII's deterrent
purpose."53
2. The Majority Opinion in Suders
In Suders, the Court held that in order to establish constructive
discharge, an employee must show "that the abusive working
environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as
a fitting response. " " As it did with hostile work environment claims
in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court delineated two categories of
constructive discharge claims-those that are precipitated by "an
48. Id.
49. Id. at 763-65.
50. Id. at 765; accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
51. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004).
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official act of the company"55 and those that are not.56 In cases in
which the constructive discharge claim is based on an official act of
the employer, a tangible employment action has occurred and the
employer may not assert the Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense.57
On the other hand, when an employer's official act does not underlie
a claim of constructive discharge, a tangible employment action has
not occurred and the defense is available to the employer.5" The
Court reasoned that
official directions and declarations are the acts most likely to be
brought home to the employer, the measures over which the
employer can exercise greatest control. Absent "an official act of
the enterprise," as the last straw, the employer ordinarily would
have no particular reason to suspect that a resignation is not the
typical kind daily occurring in the work force. And as Ellerth and
Faragher further point out, an official act reflected in company
records-a demotion or a reduction in compensation, for
example-shows "beyond question" that the supervisor has used
his managerial or controlling position to the employee's disad-
vantage. Absent such an official act, the extent to which the
supervisor's misconduct has been aided by the agency relation
... is less certain. That uncertainty, our precedent establishes,
justifies affording the employer the chance to establish, through
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, that it should not be
held vicariously liable.59
Nancy Drew Suders based her constructive discharge claim on an
alleged hostile work environment. That type of claim is "one subset
55. An official act is "the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates.' Id. at 144 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
56. Id. at 148-49.
57. Id. at 148-52.
58. Id. For an argument that the Court unnecessarily complicated matters by finding that
constructive discharge may be, but is not always, a tangible employment action, see generally
James M. Weiss, Note, If He Makes You Quit, We're Not Liable: How Pennsylvania State
Police v. Suders Unnecessarily Complicates Title VII Lawsuits, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1621 (2004).
59. Suders, 542 U.S. at 148-49 (citations omitted). In Suders, the Court again pointed out
its attempt to further Congress's purpose "to promote conciliation rather than litigation of
Title VII controversies" and indicated that, by tying employer liability to the employer's
implementation of preventive and corrective measures, it furthered "Title VIIs deterrent
purpose by encourag[ing] employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
pervasive." Id. at 145 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of Title VII constructive discharge claims."6 ° A hostile work
environment claim requires an employee to show that "the offending
behavior ... [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment."6 ' The Court indicated that an employee
bringing a cause of action for constructive discharge based on a
hostile work environment must make a further showing: (1) that
there was a hostile work environment and (2) that the "working
conditions [became] so intolerable that a reasonable person would
have felt compelled to resign."62 In essence, such a claim "presents
a 'worse case' harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the
breaking point." 3
[HI arassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation may be
effected through co-worker conduct, unofficial supervisory
conduct, or official company acts. Unlike an actual termination,
which is always effected through an official act of the company,
a constructive discharge need not be. A constructive discharge
involves both an employee's decision to leave and precipitating
conduct: The former involves no official action; the latter, like a
harassment claim without any constructive discharge assertion,
may or may not involve official action.6
Employees who prove that they were constructively discharged
under Title VII, whether it is the type of constructive discharge
claim Suders brought or not, may receive the same type of damages
available in cases involving actual discriminatory discharge,
60. Id. at 143. The other type of constructive discharge claim "center[s] on a discrete
discriminatory act, such as a demotion." Martha Chamallas, Title VI's Midlife Crisis: The
Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 317-18 (2004). These are the two
different categories of constructive discharge claims that the Supreme Court identified in
Suders.
61. Suders, 542 U.S. at 146-47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). An employee, in order to state a prima facie
case of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment by a supervisor, must prove
that "(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwanted conduct
based on sex; (3) the conduct was objectively severe or pervasive [enough] to alter the
conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) she
subjectively perceived the conduct to be abusive." ROSSEIN, supra note 34, § 5:11.
62. Suders, 542 U.S. at 147.
63. Id. at 147-48.
64. Id. at 148.
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including backpay, frontpay, and compensatory and punitive
damages.65
3. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter in Suders. Thomas noted
that, under the majority's definition of constructive discharge-
which he designated as "hostile work environment plus"6 6-it is
possible for an employee to bring a constructive discharge claim
even though there has been no adverse employment action.67 In this
way, constructive discharge "does not in the least resemble actual
discharge," and yet the majority "attach[ed] the same legal conse-
quences to a constructive discharge as to an actual discharge." 8
Thomas argued that it would make sense to treat a constructive
discharge like an actual discharge "[i]f, in order to establish a
constructive discharge, an employee must prove that his employer
subjected him to an adverse employment action with the specific
intent of forcing the employee to quit."69 Thomas believed, however,
that this was not required under the majority's definition of
constructive discharge.70 Under the majority's definition, Thomas
argued that an employer should be held liable for a supervisor's
conduct only if the employer negligently allowed the conduct to
occur.
71
65. Id. at 147 n.8. For further discussion of the damages available for constructive
discharge claims, see infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
66. Suders, 542 U.S. at 154 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 153.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 154.
71. Id. Thomas would have reversed the court of appeals's judgment because Suders did
not prove that she had been subjected to an adverse employment action nor did she establish
that the PSP knew or should have known about the harassment. Id.
1822 [Vol. 47:1813
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II. THE EMPLOYER INTENT REQUIREMENT MAY HAVE BEEN
ELIMINATED
A. The Origins of Constructive Discharge: Constructive Discharge
Under the National Labor Relations Act
The concept of constructive discharge first appeared in the labor
law context.v2 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits
employers from engaging in unfair labor practices.73 Under
§158(a)(3) of the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."74 The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), the federal administrative agency created
to hear and decide unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA,75
has recognized constructive discharge since the 1930s. 76 The
NLRB developed the concept of constructive discharge to deter
employers from terminating employees simply because the
employees supported a union.7 7 In Crystal Princeton Refining Co.,78
"the leading [NLRB] case on constructive discharge,"79 the NLRB set
forth the elements of a constructive discharge claim: "First, the
burdens imposed upon the employee must cause, and be intended to
cause, a change in his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant
as to force him to resign. Second, it must be shown that those
burdens were imposed because of the employee's union activities." °
72. Id. at 141 (majority opinion); see also Cathy Shuck, Comment, That's It, I Quit:
Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 401,403(2002).
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
74. Id. § 158(a)(3).
75. Id. § 153.
76. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 141; see also Shuck, supra note 72, at 406. For a discussion of
the NLRB's treatment of constructive discharge claims, see generally Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb,
Constructive Discharge Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Study of
Undue Concern over Motives, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. 143 (1985).
77. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 357.
78. 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976).
79. Pacific FM, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 771, 796 (2000).
80. Crystal Princeton, 222 N.L.R.B. at 1069 (emphasis added). Justice Thomas cited the
Crystal Princeton test in his dissent in Suders. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 152-53 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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The NLRB initially took the position that an employee must prove
that the employer took action with the specific intent to compel the
employee to resign.8 In Muller v. United States Steel Corp.,82 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed cases brought under
the NLRA to determine the appropriate standard for establishing a
constructive discharge claim. The Tenth Circuit concluded that in
each of the cases in which constructive discharge was found, there
was sufficient evidence to find that the employer had specifically
intended to compel the employee's resignation.83 On the other hand,
the court did not find constructive discharge under the NLRA when
there was no evidence of "the existence of a scheme to get rid of the
employee.""
More recently, however, the NLRB has held that proof of the
employer's specific intent is not necessary. In Yellow Enterprise
Systems, Inc.,8 the NLRB indicated that the first prong of the test
delineated in Crystal Princeton86 "is not limited to whether the
employer specifically intended to cause the employee to quit, but
includes whether, under the circumstances, the employer reason-
ably should have foreseen that its actions would have that result.""
81. See Steven D. Underwood, Comment, Constructive Discharge and the Employer's State
of Mind: A Practical Standard, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 343,345 (1998).
82. 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 929 (citing J.P. Steven & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB
v. Century Broad. Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Tenn. Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d
203 (6th Cir. 1964)).
84. Id. (citing Steel Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1963)). In Muller, the
Tenth Circuit also took the view that an employee must show that the employer deliberately
intended the employee's resignation. Id. The Tenth Circuit subsequently rejected that
standard and now uses the "reasonable employee" standard. See infra notes 98, 100-03 and
accompanying text.
85. 342 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (Aug. 17, 2004), 2004 WL 1875729.
86. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
87. Yellow Enter. Sys., 2004 WL 1875729, at *5 (quoting Am. Licorice Co., 299 N.L.R.B.
145, 148 (1990)); see also Midwest Television, Inc., No. 21-CA-32858 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges
May 4, 2001), 2001 WL 1598718 (finding that the employer constructively discharged the
employee where, even though the employer may not have had the specific intent to force the
employee to resign, the employer could have anticipated that the employee would have done
so in response to the employer's actions).
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B. Two Different Standards Used by Circuit Courts
Circuit courts reluctantly acknowledged the concept of a construc-
tive discharge. It was not until 1944 that a circuit court first used
the term "constructive discharge."8 The notion eventually caught
on, and by the time Title VII was enacted in 1964, "[tlhe construc-
tive discharge doctrine was firmly established in the [lower] federal
courts."89
Two main standards have emerged in the circuit courts for
determining whether an employee was constructively discharged.90
Most circuit courts employ a "reasonable employee standard"91
approach to constructive discharge. Others use a standard that
focuses on the intent of the employer-the so-called "employer
intent standard."92
88. Shuck, supra note 72, at 407 (citing NLRB v. Waples-Platter Co., 140 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1944)).
89. Id. at 410.
90. For a general discussion of the two standards, see Chamallas, supra note 60, at 316-
17; Shari M. Goldsmith, The Supreme Court's Suders Problem: Wrong Question, Wrong Facts
Determining Whether Constructive Discharge Is a Tangible Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 832-34 (2004); Sarah H. Perry, Comment, Enough Is Enough: Per Se
Constructive Discharge for Victims of Sexually Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII,
70 WASH. L. REv. 541,548-51 (1995); Shuck, supra note 72, at 413-17. See generally Martin W.
O~roole, Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 587 (1986) (examining both standards to determine which is most
appropriate for use under Title VII). At least one author has argued that there are five
different standards currently in use. See Underwood, supra note 81, at 344.
91. O'Toole, supra note 90, at 598. This standard is also referred to as the "reasonable
person standard." See, e.g., Levendos v. Stern Entm't, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1988).
92. O'Toole, supra note 90, at 596. This standard is also referred to as the "subjective-
intent standard." See, e.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986).
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1. The Majority Approach: The "Reasonable Employee
Standard"
The First,93 Third,' Fifth," Seventh,96 Ninth,97 Tenth,9 and
Eleventh" Circuits all use the objective, "reasonable employee
standard" for constructive discharge claims brought under Title VII.
The objective standard considers whether a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign as a result
of the working conditions and focuses "on the impact of an em-
ployer's actions, whether deliberate or not, upon a 'reasonable'
employee."'0 0 To state a cause of action under Title VII using this
standard, an employee need only establish two factors: (1) that there
was harassing conduct so intolerable that a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign and (2) that the employee's
action in resigning was reasonable under the circumstances.10' In
the courts that use the objective standard, "no finding of a specific
intent on the part of the employer to bring about a discharge is
required for the application of the constructive discharge
doctrine." 102 In fact, these courts generally believe that "such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the purpose of the construc-
tive discharge doctrine to protect employees from conditions so
93. See, e.g., Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 731-32 (1st Cir. 1999); Calhoun
v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986); Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114,
119 (1st Cir. 1977).
94. See, e.g., Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa.
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004); Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1230-31; Goss v. Exxon
Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
95. See, e.g., Shafer v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 376 F.3d 386, 397 n.13 (5th Cir.
2004); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2001); Bourque
v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. See, e.g., Tutman v. WBBM-TV, IncICBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000);
Simpson v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999).
97. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000); Nolan v.
Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. See, e.g., Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1514 (10th Cir. 1997); Derr v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1986).
99. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989);
Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987).
100. Levendos v. Stern Entm't, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1988).
101. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 445 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub non. Pa. State Police
v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
102. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
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unreasonably harsh that a reasonable person would feel compelled
to leave the job."'
2. The Minority Approach: The "Employer Intent Standard"
In the Second, 1°4 Fourth, 05  Sixth," Eighth,' °7  and D.C.'"8
Circuits, an employee claiming constructive discharge under Title
VII must prove that the "employer ... intentionally create[d] an
intolerable work atmosphere that force[d the] employee to quit
involuntarily."' 9 The "employer intent standard" used by these
courts requires a showing of "deliberate action on the part of the
employer.""0 Initially, courts using the "employer intent standard"
required specific intent on the part of the employer: "To constitute
a constructive discharge, the employer's actions must have been
taken with the intention of forcing the employee to quit."' More
recently, however, many of these courts have relaxed this stringent
requirement." 2 These courts now permit an employee to show
employer intent by submitting "evidence that [the] employee's
resignation was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
103. Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining to determine the employer's
state of mind).
104. See, e.g., Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2000).
105. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2001);
Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Cavalier
Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir. 1995).
106. See, e.g., Driggers v. City of Owensboro, 110 Fed. Appx. 499,506 (6th Cir. 2004); Logan
v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2001).
107. See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829 (8th Cir. 2004); Jackson v.
Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2001).
108. See, e.g., Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
109. Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 73.
110. Id. at 74. The courts' focus on the deliberateness of the employer's action resembles
the NLRB's approach in early NLRA actions. See Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 832-33.
111. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).
112. See Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 833-34; Shuck, supra note 72, at 415-16. See generally
Stacey Elizabeth Tjon Aasland, Case Comment, The Constructive Discharge Doctrine and Its
Applicability to Sexual Harassment Cases: Does It Matter What the Employer Intended
Anymore?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 1067,1079 (1995) (discussing Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs Local No. 101, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993), in which the Eighth Circuit departed from
its former requirement that the employee show specific intent on the part of the employer).
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employer's conduct. " 113 Proof that "the employer's actions were
deliberate and not merely negligen[t] or ineffective[]," however, is
still required."4 This requirement differentiates the "employer
intent standard" from the "reasonable employee standard." Under
the "reasonable employee standard," a court may find that the
employee was constructively discharged when the employer's
conduct was deliberate and when the employer acted negligently." 5
C. Suders May Have Eliminated the Requirement of "Employer
Intent"
Acknowledging the split among the federal courts of appeal as to
the elements of constructive discharge claims, the Third Circuit
explicitly rejected imposing a requirement on Nancy Drew Suders
to prove that the PSP intended to force her to resign:
We hold that no finding of a specific intent on the part of the
employer to bring about a discharge is required for the applica-
tion of the constructive discharge doctrine. The court need
merely find that the employer knowingly permitted conditions
of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable
person subject to them would resign.1 6
Although the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity in
Suders to expressly address the issue of employer intent, a New
York district court found that the Suders decision did not overrule
the "requirement that an employee alleging a constructive discharge
claim demonstrate deliberate action on the part of the employer."" 7
113. Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 131 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision),
No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 741368, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1997).
114. Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 230 (2d Cir. 2004) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 74); see also Amirmokri v.
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To prove constructive discharge,
[a plaintiffi must show that the [employer] deliberately made his working conditions
'intolerable' in an effort to induce him to quit.").
115. See Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 832-33.
116. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 444 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984)), vacated sub nom. Pa.
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
117. EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641, at *15 n. 11 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2004).
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In EEOC v. Grief Brothers Corp., the EEOC filed suit against Greif,
Inc.,"' alleging the employer subjected its former employee, Michael
Sabo, to same-sex sexual harassment and constructively discharged
Sabo in violation of Title VII." 9 The EEOC alleged that within his
first two weeks of working at the employer's plant, Sabo was
"harassed, emasculated, humiliated and ridiculed" by three
coworkers and Sabo's coworkers' "offensive verbal and physical
conduct, include[ed] conduct that caused Sabo concern for his
physical safety."12 ° According to the EEOC, the harassment
continued even after Sabo complained to management.'2 ' After an
incident in which his coworkers allegedly sped up an assembly line
to make his work more difficult, Sabo could not "take [it] anymore"
and walked out of the plant.'22
The EEOC filed suit and argued that the Supreme Court had
eliminated any requirement that an employee alleging constructive
discharge demonstrate that the employer acted with deliberate-
ness."'23 The EEOC's argument was based on the Court's finding in
Suders that "harassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation
may be effected through co-worker conduct, unofficial supervisory
conduct, or official company acts. Unlike an actual termination,
which is always effected through an official act of the company, a
constructive discharge need not be."" The Grief Brothers court,
however, disagreed:
This Court does not agree with the EEOC's interpretation of this
passage. This statement by the Court is simply a recognition
that constructive discharge does not ordinarily involve an
official, overt adverse employment action by the employer-an
unremarkable proposition. This Court does not read Suders as
eliminating the requirement that an employer's disregard to the
hostile environment be deliberate, and neither have other courts
in this circuit. 12
5
118. The employer's name was "Greif'; it was misspelled in the complaint. See id. at n.1.
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id. at *3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *15 n.11.
124. Id. (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004)).
125. Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the court found that the EEOC had put forth
sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the employer's conduct in failing
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Although the Grief Brothers court rejected reading Suders as
eliminating the need for an employee alleging constructive dis-
charge to demonstrate deliberate action on the part of the employer,
Justice Thomas thought that the Suders majority opinion did just
that.126 This Note suggests that Justice Thomas may have been
correct.
Three aspects of the majority opinion in Suders seem to indicate
that the Court has rejected the requirement of deliberate action by
the employer in a constructive discharge claim. First, in defining
constructive discharge, the Court adopted the language of those
courts that have specifically rejected a showing of employer intent
in constructive discharge claims and, in so doing, rejected the
definition used by the courts that require an employee to establish
employer intent. Second, the Court designated two types of con-
structive discharge claims-in one type, employer liability can be
premised on the employer's negligence rather than on deliberate
actions. Finally, by describing one type of constructive discharge as
an extreme form of sexual harassment, it follows that an employer
should not escape liability for constructive discharge merely because
the employer lacked the requisite intent when that same employer
could be found liable for sexual harassment without having acted
intentionally. Thus, for employees in the circuits that previously
required a showing of deliberate action on the part of the employer,
it appears that Suders may have opened a door allowing a construc-
tive discharge claim to be based on employer negligence.
1. The Language Used by the Supreme Court
The first indication that the Court appears to have endorsed the
"objective employee standard" and rejected the "employer intent
standard" is the Court's definition of "constructive discharge." The
Court's language in Suders is very similar to the language used by
courts who embrace the "objective employee standard." In Suders,
to remedy the harassing conduct was deliberate and, as a result, denied the employer's motion
for summary judgment with respect to the constructive discharge claim. Id. at *16.
126. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 153 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Others have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., 2 PAUL N. Cox, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 18.04 (3d ed. 2005); Marcia Coyle, Mixed Outcome: Workplace Ruling Has
Something for Each Side, 231 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2004).
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the Court held that a constructive discharge claim arising from an
allegedly hostile work environment requires the employee to "show
that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that
[the employee's] resignation qualified as a fitting response."'27
Similarly, the Third Circuit below recognized constructive discharge
when "acts of discrimination in violation of Title VII ... make
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would
be forced to resign."'28 The Fifth Circuit has employed comparable
verbiage: "To demonstrate constructive discharge, a plaintiff must
prove that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position would feel compelled to resign.' 29
Compare that language to the language of courts that use the
"employer intent standard." The Grief Brothers court stated that"[a]
constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting
directly, deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resigna-
tion."3 ° The Fourth Circuit also uses the word "deliberate" in its
definition of constructive discharge: "A constructive discharge occurs
when an employer creates intolerable working conditions in a
deliberate effort to force the employee to resign."' 3 ' Likewise, in the
Eighth Circuit, "[clonstructive discharge occurs when an employer
deliberately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable,
thereby forcing her to quit." 13 2 Finally, the Sixth Circuit requires a
plaintiff to show that "the employer ... deliberately create[d]
intolerable working conditions."'33
127. Suders, 542 U.S. at 134 (majority opinion).
128. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984)), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542
U.S. 129 (2004).
129. Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc., No. 04-60028,2004 WL 2554866, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 11,
2004).
130. Grief Bros., 2004 WL 2202641, at *15 (emphasis added) (quoting Lopez v. S.B.
Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)).
131. Elkins v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 217 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision), No. 00-1077, 2000 WL 962669, at *2 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000) (emphasis added)
(quoting Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994)).
132. Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)
(citing Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 709 (8th Cir. 1999)).
133. Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 2001) (omission and alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d
1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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Every circuit that applies the "employer intent standard" patently
includes the word "deliberate" in the definition of constructive
discharge and, yet, the word is noticeably missing from the
Supreme Court's definition in Suders.34 Instead, the Court chose to
use language similar to language used in courts that apply the
"objective employee standard."35
2. Constructive Discharge Claims Categorized into Two Types
The second indication that Suders may have eliminated the need
to show employer intent is the Court's reliance on agency principles
in delineating two types of constructive discharge claims.
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 36 the Court stated its
belief that it was Congress's intent to limit employer liability for
acts of its employees under Title VII.137 Based on this belief and
basic agency principles, the Vinson Court held that employers are
not always liable for their supervisors' acts of sexual harassment. 138
The Court returned to agency principles in Ellerth and Faragher.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an employer is liable for
the torts of its employees that were committed "in the scope of their
employment."'39 The Ellerth Court, however, found that harassment
is generally not within the scope of a supervisor's employment. 4 °
Section 219(2) of the Restatement provides:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master,
or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority,
134. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
135. Moreover, the Court did not suggest that the Third Circuit's analysis on this point was
incorrect. See generally Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
136. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
137. Id. at 72.
138. Id.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
140. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998).
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or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relation.'
The Court held that under subsection (b), the employer is liable for
the harassing conduct of a supervisor when "it knew or should have
known about the conduct and failed to stop it."'42
Turning to the language of subsection (d), the Court held that
when the supervisor's act consisted of a tangible employment action,
there could be no doubt that the supervisor's conduct was "aided in
the agency relation."" In such instances, the employer is vicari-
ously liable for the conduct of the supervisor.'" On the other hand,
an employer is not always liable for a supervisor's acts that do not
result in a tangible employment action.'45 The Court acknowledged
that, although it could be argued that the power and authority that
accompany supervisor status always make a supervisor's conduct
aided in the agency relationship, "there are acts of harassment a
supervisor might commit which might be the same acts a
coemployee would commit, and there may be some circumstances
where the supervisor's status makes little difference."' 46 Therefore,
the Court reasoned, in order to promote the policies of Title VII, the
employer may assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
when there was no tangible employment action taken. 4 v
Using the same agency principles, the Suders Court designated
two types of constructive discharge claims-those predicated on the
employer's official act and those in which an official act of the
employer is not the basis of the constructive discharge. In the first
type, the employer is vicariously liable. In the second, liability is not
automatically imposed on the employer."* In situations in which
there was no official act of the employer, liability will attach to the
employer only if the employer cannot establish the elements of the
Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense. In other words, liability will
attach when the employer was negligent in failing to "exercis[e]
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
143. Id. at 761-62.
144. Id. at 763.
145. See id. at 765.
146. Id. at 763.
147. See id. at 764-65.
148. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004).
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reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior. " 149 Thus, a court could find that the employee
was constructively discharged based on a finding that the employer
acted with negligence. This is directly contrary to a requirement
that an employee alleging constructive discharge show that the
employer deliberately acted in an effort to get the employee to
resign.
150
3. Constructive Discharge as "Sexual Harassment Plus"
A third indication that the Court may have eliminated the
employer intent requirement is the Court's description of the type
of constructive discharge predicated on sexual harassment as "worse
case" scenario sexual harassment.15 ' An employer is liable for
"ordinary" sexual harassment by a supervisor when the employer
"knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop
it." 152 In other words, the employer will be liable for a supervisor's
harassing conduct when the employer acted negligently. If the Court
allows an employer's liability to be based on its negligent conduct in
"ordinary" sexual harassment, then, absent specific instruction to
the contrary, it is unlikely that the Court would impose a higher
standard for an employee to meet when the conduct has become so
egregious that it rises to the level of "worse case" scenario sexual
harassment.
III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SUDERS
Without a requirement to prove employer intent in constructive
discharge claims-when considered in light of the Suders Court's
definition of constructive discharge and the damages it made
available under constructive discharge claims-some employees
149. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).
150. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
151. Suders, 542 U.S. at 147.
152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. The lower courts have "uniformly" imposed liability on
employers for coworker harassment using this same negligence standard. See Faragherv. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799; see also PRIMER ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 51
(Nancy J. Sedmak & Chrissie Vidas eds., 6th ed. 1994) ("An employer is liable for sexual
harassment committed by co-workers if it knew, or should have known, of the conduct unless
it can show that it took 'immediate and appropriate corrective action.).
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may be motivated to quit their jobs without first making their
employers aware of the harassment.153 The Court has previously
indicated that the "primary objective" of Title VII was "not to
provide redress but to avoid harm" " and has cited with approval
EEOC policies that were "'designed to encourage victims of
harassment to come forward.' " 5 "Title VII is designed to encourage
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms .... [And] to promote conciliation rather than litigation
156 Suders, however, may serve as an impetus for employees to
file constructive discharge claims.
The most common type of constructive discharge claims brought
under Title VII are claims based on hostile work environments and
are not based on official acts by supervisors. 57 Prior to Suders, it
was not uncommon for an employee to bring both a hostile work
environment claim and a constructive discharge claim together.
158
Now, assuming that there is not a separate requirement to establish
the employer's intent, it is even easier to do so. Employees can
just "piggyback" constructive discharge claims onto hostile work
environment claims. If an employee has sufficient evidence to
survive the employer's motion for summary judgment on the hostile
work environment claim, she can expect that her constructive
discharge claim will probably survive summary judgment as well.
The difference between the harassment necessary to give rise to a
hostile work environment claim and that necessary for a construc-
tive discharge claim is "only a matter of degree." 159 Factfinders in
hostile work environment constructive discharge claims "are thus
called on to make fine calibrations of the magnitude of the harass-
ment faced by the plaintiff"'60 and, therefore, summary judgment
153. Even if Suders did not eliminate the requirement to prove employer intent, this may
still be true in those circuits that currently use the reasonable employee standard in
constructive discharge cases as a result of the Court's specific holdings in Suders.
154. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; accord Suders, 542 U.S. at 145; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
155. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
156. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
157. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 314-15, 317-18; see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J.
Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548,550-51,565 (2001)
(indicating that seventy percent of the sexual harassment cases filed in federal courts between
1986 and 1995 included a hostile work environment claim).
158. See Perry, supra note 90, at 546.
159. 2 Cox, supra note 126, § 18.04.
160. Chamallas, supra note 60, at 316.
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may often be inappropriate. Moreover, due to the fact-intensive
nature of the Ellerth/Faragher defense (which focuses on the
reasonableness of the parties' actions), summary judgment disposi-
tion may be even less appropriate. 161
The majority of employment discrimination cases are settled out
of court.'62 Although "[aill litigation is expensive[,] ... employment
discrimination litigation is particularly so" and the legal fees and
costs of litigation are enough to make many employers settle out of
court "simply to avoid these costs."'63 In addition, although employ-
ees traditionally have had low success rates at trial,16 employee win
rates in employment discrimination cases brought in federal court
are on the rise."' When this fact is considered in light of the
unpredictability of jury decisions, employers have an even greater
reason to want to avoid the courtroom.' 6
161. See Jill L. Rosenberg & Tracy L. Scheidtmann, Sexual Harassment, in EMPLOYMENT
LAW YEARBOOK ch. 12, § 12:8 (Timothy J. Long ed., 2005); see also Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp.,
156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the trier of fact should decide the sufficiency
of the employer's antiharassment policy). But see Chamallas, supra note 60, at 354 (noting
that "recent empirical studies indicate that employers are having considerable success in
establishing the defense, often at the summary judgment stage").
162. See 2 JOHN F. BUCKLEY 1V & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS § 13:5 (2d ed. 2005); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440 (2004)
(stating that almost seventy percent of employment litigation settles). In 1998, only about
one-third of the employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts actually went to trial
and since then the percentage of employment discrimination cases that have proceeded to
trial has decreased even further. Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let's Get a Vision: Drafting
Effective Arbitration Agreements in Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards To Insure
Equal Access to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 87, 88 (2004).
163. 2 BUCKLEY & LINDSAY, supra note 162, § 13:5. An employer can expect to spend
between $100,000 and $250,000 to defend an employment lawsuit through trial. See Shari
Caudron, Angry Employees Bite Back in Court, 75 PERSONNEL J. 32,36 (1996); see also Leader
& Burger, supra note 162, at 90.
164. See generally Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
165. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 162, at 441-42.
166. Gregory Todd Jones, Note, Testing for Structural Change in Legal Doctrine: An
Empirical Look at the Plaintiffs Decision To Litigate Employment Disputes a Decade After the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997, 1008-09, 1024-26, 1028 (2002); see also
Marc R. Engel, Constructive Discharges Resulting from Sexual Harassment: The Supreme
Court Finally Weighs In, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, Aug. 29, 2004 ("[Wihen viewed in the context
of increasing jury awards, ... the stakes have never been higher for employers when it comes
to harassment claims.").
1836 [Vol. 47:1813
20061 ELIMINATING THE INTENT REQUIREMENT 1837
After Suders, employers defending hostile work environment
constructive discharge claims have greater incentive to attempt a
settlement than they did before. 167 Knowing that there is a good
chance that their cases will never make it to trial, employees may
see financial benefit in bringing constructive discharge claims
rather than allowing their employers an opportunity to correct the
harassment."' And, if the case happens to make it to trial, there is
significantly more at stake in terms of damages available to an
employee who brings a constructive discharge claim and a hostile
work environment claim than there is to an employee who brings
only a hostile work environment claim. An employee who has been
subjected to a hostile work environment is entitled to receive
backpay and frontpay; a court, however, is not likely to award
backpay or frontpay unless the employee is able to prove that she
was also constructively discharged." 9 "Victims of hostile environ-
ments who cannot prove constructive discharge are thus limited to
those compensatory and punitive damages traceable to the abuse on
the job."7 ° The possibility of being awarded backpay and frontpay
is significant because the amount of compensatory and punitive
167. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
168. Of course, these employees face the significant risk of quitting their jobs and not
prevailing in subsequent litigation.
169. Chamallas, supra note 60, at 315; see also Sara Kagay, Note, Applying the Ellerth
Defense to Constructive Discharge: An Affirmative Answer, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1035,1047 (2000);
Shuck, supra note 72, at 403 n.7. Backpay compensates a plaintiff for earnings the plaintiff
would have received had there been no discriminatory conduct. Frontpay is compensation for
loss of future earnings and may be awarded to a successful plaintiff in lieu of reinstatement.
170. Chamallas, supra note 60, at 315. Compensatory damages may be awarded for "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment
of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000). Punitive damages are
available to an employee who demonstrates that the employer discriminated "with malice or
with reckless indifference." Id. § 1981a(b)(1). The factors courts consider in determining
punitive damages include:
1. The severity of the misconduct;
2. The amount needed to prevent repetition in light of defendant's financial condition
or to deter others from similar discriminatory conduct in the future;
3. The nature, extent, and severity of the harm caused by the misconduct;
4. The existence and frequency of post-discriminatory conduct;
5. Whether the employer has lied or attempted to conceal discriminatory conduct; and
6. Whether the employer has made threats or engaged in retaliatory conduct.
Jean Boler, Damages Issues in Sexual Harassment Cases--Plaintiffs Perspective, in
LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 446, 458 (Matthew B. Schiff & Linda C. Kramer
eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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damages an employee can recover under Title VII is capped.17'
Backpay and frontpay, however, are not subject to these caps and
thus "[tihe significance of recovering on the constructive discharge
claim ... remains particularly important for hostile environment
claimants who have not suffered other economic loss in the form of
discriminatory demotions, unequal pay, or lost promotions."" 2
Employees, therefore, have the potential of receiving a significantly
greater amount in damages if they resign and file a constructive
discharge claim than they do if they stay employed and file a claim
for hostile work environment. And, unsurprisingly, the greater the
amount of damages available, the more likely it is that employees
will sue their employers.
173
CONCLUSION
There has been an "explosion" in the number of Title VII cases
filed in federal court.
74
The number of employment suits in federal court increased
by 430% between 1971 and 1991. The four following years
witnessed another jump of 128%. In the last thirty years, the
amount of employment litigation has grown at a rate almost ten
times greater than the rate of increase in other types of civil
litigation. 175
171. Chamallas, supra note 60, at 321. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory
and punitive damages are capped depending on the size of the employer and cannot exceed
$300,000.42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
172. Chamallas, supra note 60, at 321. It should be noted, however, that under Title VII,
a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages, and that
recovery of backpay has always been limited to amounts that the plaintiff did
not, or reasonably could not, recoup through securing comparable employment
after quitting her job. Thus, even the plaintiffwho proves constructive discharge
is not entitled to sit tight and wait to be vindicated through a judgment
awarding reinstatement and backpay. Instead, Title VII explicitly requires
backpay awards to be reduced by "interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence."
Id. at 319-20 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000)).
173. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATON LAW 250,261-64
(John J. Donohue III ed., 2d ed. 2003).
174. Id. at 265.
175. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 399-400 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
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ELIMINATING THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
Employment discrimination cases now constitute nearly 10% of all
federal civil cases.176
Rather than deterring employment litigation, Suders may, in fact,
spawn more claims. By examining the Court's objective definition of
constructive discharge, its delineation of two categories of construc-
tive discharge, and its designation of one of those categories as an
extreme form of harassment, it appears that the Court may have
abolished any requirement for employees alleging constructive
discharge to show that their former employer deliberately acted in
an effort to make them resign. The elimination of a need to show
employer intent, together with the Suders Court's implication that
the difference between the level of harassment necessary to prove
harassment and that necessary to prove constructive discharge is
just a matter of degree, and its holding that an employee who
successfully proves constructive discharge may recover the same
damages as an employee who proves actual discriminatory dis-
charge may make it easier and more appealing for potential
plaintiffs to bring constructive discharge claims.
This Note does not intend to suggest that constructive discharge
should not be an actionable claim. Certainly in some situations an
employee truly has no other option but to remove herself from the
harassing environment. In other situations, however, where the
harassment has not risen to such levels, there may be some
individuals who would opt not to give the employer an opportunity
to remedy the situation and would instead resign, choosing to take
their chances in court. "An employee[, however,] has an obligation
not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too
quickly."'77 This Note merely asserts that insofar as it creates an
incentive for employee to "jump ship" prematurely, Suders operates
contrary to what the Supreme Court has found to be the "design" of
Title VII.
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176. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 162, at 429,432.
177. Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Summit v. S-B
Power Tool, 121 F.3d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 1997)).
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